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1 – Introduction 
 
This paper amalgamates two segments of sport economics research, more 
specifically, the study of association football to investigate relationships between 
debt and financial performance in sporting companies. This relationship’s existence 
is related to the Efficiency Wage (EW) concept, whereby debt is borrowed to 
undertake human capital investments (i.e. a club’s players) to increase productivity 
(i.e. team performances), helping obtain financial success to settle debt in the long 
run (Blanchard and Johnson, 2013). This relationship’s existence is also considered 
against club size and is reviewed within’ distinct context of the English Premier 
League (EPL), utilising panel models to produce econometric estimations. 
Regarding the EPL, or, the Premiership, this is England’s top tier of 
professional football. It replaced the First Division in 1992 and is regulated by the 
Football Association (FA) (Premier League, 2020). There are three leagues below 
the EPL, collectively known as the Football League (FL). The EPL is connected to 
the top division of the FL through systems of promotion and relegation, whereby 
three FL clubs are promoted, replacing three relegated EPL clubs after each season. 
League positions are determined by points obtained throughout the season, 
including: three points for a win, one point for a draw and zero points for a loss, 
and teams equal on points are ranked by aggregate goal difference. The team 
finishing top is crowned the EPL champion (Premier League, 2020). 
Regularly in the EPL, debt financing is used for human capital investments, as 
this is related to higher team performances (TP). For example, Hall et al. (2002), 
Camichael et al. (2011) and Rohde and Breuer (2016) suggest human capital 
investments stimulate TP. These higher TPs then create higher financial 
performances (FP). For example, Samagaio et al. (2009) evidenced the positive 
relationship between TP and FP, whereby higher TPs lead to higher FPs from a 
long-term perspective.  However, human capital investments are also linked to FPs 
themselves, through enhancing brand-management revenue streams (Rohde and 
Breuer, 2016). Although, investments receive negative criticism, as higher TPs do 
not always coincide with increased investment. Moreover, clubs could become 
engulfed in ‘debt-gambles’ (Rapp, 2004), hence why former Union of European 
Football Associations (UEFA) president, Michael Platini, describes it as 
‘unsustainable-debt’ (BBC, 2020). Therefore, UEFA introduced Financial Fair 
Play (FFP), with two main goals: protecting long-term financial stability and 
restoring competitive balance in European football (Vöpel, 2011).  
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Furthermore, with the aim of investigating the relationship between debt and 
FP in the EPL, the objectives of this paper followed to achieve this are: to explore 
the current EPL wage debate, to test and discover the relationship between debt, 
intangible assets, and TP against FP from the 2000/01 season to the 2017/18 season 
in the EPL, and to test and identify whether the relationship between debt, 
intangible assets, and TP against FP from the 2000/01 season to the 2017/18 season 
in the EPL differs depending on club size. 
Achieving these allow this paper to help fill a research gap regarding how a 
club’s capital structure is often used to enhance FP in football, and will add to 
previous research regarding how wages impact on FP may have 
altered since FFP introduction and the modern-day productivity paradox. 
Additionally, it allows this paper to provide objective evidence supporting large 
human capital investments in football, often in negative limelight’s. 
Moreover, the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines previous empirical 
research into these relationships. Section 3 justifies the research approach and data 
set used for analysis. Section 4 contains analysis from econometric estimations. 
Section 5 provides concluding remarks, regarding a summary, future research 
recommendations, and implications. The Appendix following includes further 
information on empirical evidence, data adjustments, econometric estimations, and 
an ethics form. 
 
2 – Literature Review 
 
Capital structures of EPL clubs have heavily favoured debt from equity for many 
years, despite significant revenue increases. An underlying debt-FP relationship 
created by a criticised wage-TP relationship is to blame, whereby this relationship 
is often why ‘debt-gambles’ are created. UEFA staggered to implement regulation 
preventing such gambles, but eventually introduced FFP, despite the criticisms over 
the trade-off it creates, and its difference to other sport’s regulations. The next few 
sections discuss the theoretical framework acting as a foundation to these 
relationships, and the relatable empirical evidence supporting and opposing them. 
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2.1 Theoretical Evidence 
EPL clubs often borrow significant amounts of debt (Parliament. House of 
Commons, 2011), which is then used to invest into player human capital (i.e. wages) 
to achieve team-success and financial-success. However, this relationship between 
investment into human capital and team-success resembles the EW concept 
described by Blanchard and Johnson (2013), whereby human capital investments 
into players could create greater work incentives, creating more productive players, 
resulting in the cost of higher wages being paid off in the long-run, through 
productivity gains enhancing revenue. For example, in the EPL, these human 
capital investments may encourage a player to find ‘good form’, improving TPs. 
Therefore, the EW concept pursued often regards Rebitzer’s (1994) explanation of 
employer’s using wages as a ‘carrot’ to persuade workers to supply higher 
productivity. However, as the EPL is different to traditional labour markets because 
wages ‘systematically reflect’ player skills and performances (Carmichael et al., 
2011), paying higher wages does not necessarily result in increased productivity 
(i.e. team-success), as you essentially get what you pay for. Hence why others use 
intangible assets instead of wage costs to measure player capital investments 
(Mnzava, 2013), as described later. Team-success also may not follow due to 
Arkelof’s (1984) mentions of an Equity theory, whereby players may not become 
more productive because they are on lower wages than others. Additionally, a 
modern-day productivity paradox resulting from technological advances 
(Brynjolfsson et al., 2017), could destroy this relationship, as players could become 
more focused on areas like social media performance (i.e. number of followers), 
instead of playing performance, despite wage increases. 
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Although significant amounts of debt are borrowed to fund the EW concept 
described, it is not because EPL clubs struggle to generate revenue. In fact, EPL 
clubs find relative ease generating revenue, because increasing EPL competition 
has created results unpredictability (Deloitte, 2018), and this excitement of 
unpredictability attracts demand. For example, Buraimo and Simmon’s (2008) 
modelled EPL attendances, discovering a u-shape relationship between win 
probability and attendance. They described a ‘David versus Goliath’ effect, 
whereby fans are attracted to games if their teams have low winning probabilities. 
Hence, with increased competition, fans become win-optimistic, drawing larger 
audiences. 
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Therefore, the 2010-12 Football Governance Report (Parliament. House of 
Commons, 2011), states the problem is not revenue generation, but instead, 
controlling expenditure. Perfectly demonstrated in the EPL’s 2009/10 season, 
whereby total EPL revenue reached above £2 billion (Deloitte, 2011) for the first 
time, whereas operating profit margins decreased 12% since the EPL first begun 
(Parliament. House of Commons, 2011). This is because EPL clubs are attracted to 
‘chasing the dream’ (Wilson and Joyce, 2008, p. 10), whereby clubs borrow 
to invest in talented players, meaning wages (which reflect player talent) increase 
to achieve team-success, and eventually, financial-success (Parliament. House of 
Commons, 2011). Although instances of using equity exist, EPL clubs typically 
choose debt, which could potentially be because of debt’s traditional benefits over 
equity, like being a cheaper source of financing, especially for smaller clubs. 
However, this paper follows the favouring of debt-financing in accordance with 
owners having over-optimistic club visions, as described by former 
Bundesliga1 Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Christian Müller (Parliament. House 
of Commons, 2011, p. 24): 
 
‘all over the world [that] most club executives tend to operate riskily, tend to 
overestimate their chances.... This may result in disproportionate spending relative 
to the income some clubs generate...’  
 
Therefore, owner’s over-optimism on club expectations, as Müller described, 
results in team-success urgencies creating short-run win-maximisation aims. 
However, economists did not always favour win-maximisation, as manager’s and 
owner’s aims have always been controversial. Reverting as far to Alchian (1950), 
economists argued, to survive in competitive environments, decisions needed to 
resemble profit-maximisation, therefore, they assumed industry results followed 
profit-maximisation, regardless of owner’s or manager’s motives. As time 
progressed, other economists were even pushed towards utility-
maximising behaviour, like Atkinson et al. (1988). Nonetheless, many researchers 
still supported profit maximization. However, from the 1990’s, economists 
like Alchian (1950) faced criticism over profit-maximisation originating from 
natural selection rather than individual motives, therefore, win-
maximisation became favourable. For example, Dutta and Radner (1999) found 
profit maximisation creates certain bankruptcy, but with other strategies, long-term 
survival becomes likely. Even with different club owners, win-
 
1 The top tier of German professional football (BBC, 2020). 
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maximisation is favoured. For example, Vrooman (2009) mentioned if 
owners are ‘sportsman owners’, aims are primarily win-maximisation, and if 
owners are ‘profit-maximising owners’, they aim to optimise inputs (player-
investments) and outputs (financial-success), and outputs can only be achieved 
through team-success. Short-run win-maximisation behaviour but to profit 
constraints (i.e. a minimum profit to be met), also became favourable (Késenne, 
2006; Samagaio et al., 2009).  
Nonetheless, Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski (2009) agreed with Vrooman’s 
(2009) ‘profit-maximising’ owner proposition, concluding short-run win-
maximisation is perceived as a route to obtain higher profits in the long-run. This 
is because financial-success in football is based on short-run results, as it is a ‘zero-
sum game’, whereby league position can decrease, regardless of how well TPs are 
in ‘absolute terms’ (Vöpel, 2011). Therefore, if aiming for other short-run 
objectives, this could cause relegation, destroying future profit opportunities 
(Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski, 2009). Hence why owners use short-run debt, 
as short-run equity is often unavailable to produce these short-run results. 
Moreover, borrowing for short-run win-maximisation, to achieve desires to 
‘maximise global, long-term returns’ (Zimbalist, 2003), should conclude in short-
run debt being settled. However, when team-success does not follow debt increases, 
wages and transfer fees increase above revenue (Financial Times, 2019), therefore, 
clubs have no choice but to continue borrowing. Additionally, club’s ‘high 
expectations’ mean they maintain continuous borrowing (Rapp, 2004). This is 
specifically demonstrated through Gerrard’s (2004) case study into Leed’s United 
F.C’s ‘Dash for Glory’ period, whereby a debt investment of a £60 million, 25-year 
corporate bond, securitised against gate revenues in 1999 was made to achieve 
short-run win-maximisation. However, team-success did not follow, but remaining 
high expectations (Rapp, 2004) caused continuations of ‘chasing the dream’ 
(Wilson and Joyce, 2008, p. 10), resulting in wage costs quadrupling after 1999 and 
gearing ratios becoming significantly high at 98.34% (Gerrard, 2004). Therefore, 
this ‘debt-gamble' (Gerrard, 2004) resulted in significant losses for Leed’s United 
F.C, concluding in a winding-up order from its debtor, HM Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC), to be issued in 2007 (BBC, 2007). 
Differentially, ‘debt-gambles' may oppose Gerrard’s (2004) case study, as 
proven by Drut and Raballand (2012) who found clubs which borrow more freely, 
like in the EPL, hire more playing talents, and obtain better results than others. 
Therefore, research’s mixed results show debt-gambles can result in completely 
opposite results, hence the term ‘gamble’. 
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According to Szymanski (2013), ‘debt-gambles’, like in Gerrard’s (2004) case 
study, do not create team-success because managers occasionally misinterpret 
player talent before signings, relating to a statement by Quirk and Fort (1999, p. 
85): 
 
‘If general managers really were perfect judges of talent, there would be no 
need to play the league schedule to determine the league champion – we’d simply 
award the title to the team with the highest payroll.’ 
 
However, Szymanski (2013) also mentioned, that even if managers had perfect 
judgements, players would still envy another player if they were on higher salaries, 
and this envy creates inabilities to cooperate between equally talented players, 
leading to no team-success. This heavily relates to the Equity Theory defined by 
Padgett (2012), whereby individuals are less interested in their 
absolute life position, and more interested in their situation relative to 
others. Vöpel (2011) also stated players can unexpectedly have poor fitness or get 
injured. Therefore, large debate over high EPL wages has originated from 
individuals who do not believe TPs follow wage increases, causing many to believe 
wage increases are just a result of player’s ‘insatiable greed’ (Morrison, 1996). 
However, origins of support for this debate arise when team-success follows, hence 
Forbes’ headline ‘Premier League Wages Are a Disgrace – Except When Your 
Team’s Winning’ (Forbes, 2019). Furthermore, despite disbelievers, the wages-
TP relationship is significantly supported within’ research. Some researchers, like 
Hall et al. (2002), suggested this relationship has backwards causation, however, 
the favoured explanation is the direct relationship, whereby increased investment 
into human capital ‘buys success on the field’ (Carmichael et al., 2011) as it 
increases TPs (Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski, 2009; Carmichael et al., 2011). 
This is because player wages ‘systematically reflect’ player skills and performances 
(Carmichael et al., 2011). However, despite heavy support, questions remain 
over the relationship’s test reliability, as with Hall et al.’s (2002) Granger Causality 
test, which is considered very weak (Szymanski, 2013), and Garcia-del-Barrio and 
Szymanski’s (2009) unbalanced panel data set, producing bias (Iram et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, although debt-fueled, borrowing for short-run win-
maximisation (i.e. increased TPs), should create long-run FP according to 
Blanchard and Johnson’s (2013) EW concept, as heavily supported within’ 
research (Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski, 2009; Rohde and Breuer, 
2016). Dobson and Goddard (1998) state this exists because improved 
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performances attract spectators, increasing income from matchday revenue, 
broadcasting rights, commercial sponsorships, and merchandising. International 
competitions are also considered a main factor in increasing these revenue streams 
(Samagaio et al., 2009; Carmichael et al., 2011; Rohde and Breuer, 2016), as 
increasing talent means teams become more likely to attend remunerative European 
competitions, hence the term, ‘superstar’ wage effect (Carmichael et al., 2011). 
However, Carmichael et al. (2011) also mentions increased FP is driven by access 
to capital resources, for example, debt. With greater capital access, clubs obtain 
‘sustained advantages’, whereby they have larger scopes to maximise wages impact 
on TPs. Moreover, although attending international competitions is considered the 
main influence, other variables do impact FP.  
Nevertheless, despite criticisms of debts impact on FP through intertwined 
relationships, Garcia-del Barrio and Szymanski (2009) state: 
 
‘...the business of soccer seems relatively easy to understand: performance 
generates revenue, and wages generate performance.’ 
 
However, as ‘debt-gambles’ have historically created over-investment (Dietl et 
al., 2007) leading to debt fallacies because all teams cannot simultaneously succeed 
(Vöpel, 2011), a ‘G-14’ payroll cap was going to be introduced by UEFA in the 
2005/06 season (Szymanski, 2013), meaning payrolls could not exceed 70% of 
revenue (Szymanski, 2013). Although, this was never introduced. This is because 
EPL debt fallacies were often related to what former US Vice-President, Al Gore, 
described as ‘inconvenient truths’, whereby as the scenario is expensive to address, 
there is natural tendencies to postpone any regulation (Hassan and Hamil, 2011, p. 
14). However, continued worsening deficits and record high-debt levels (Vöpel, 
2011) eventually caused UEFA to introduce Financial Fair Play (FFP). 
Researchers doubted FFP’s ‘fairness’, as many believed ‘break-even 
requirements’ created trade-offs between both primary goals. Vöpel (2011) 
mentioned the debt-ceiling arising from the requirement would destroy competitive 
balance because clubs would not have access to external money, diminishing 
abilities to close the gap on national champions, as financing team-investments 
becomes beyond their means. UEFA attempted narrowing this gap by introducing 
the notation, ‘relevant income’, but because larger clubs still earn more, FFP may 
restore balance amongst leading European clubs, rather than poorer clubs (Vöpel, 
2011; Grasso, 2011). Nonetheless, according to Vöpel (2011), the EPL would lose 
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competitiveness. Positive critiques refer to how the industry would move away 
from team-success originating from a club’s financial capabilities (i.e. wage 
expenditure), to managerial and administrative abilities (Grasso, 2011), as wage 
expenditure can no longer be excessive (Peeters and Szymanski, 2012). However, 
after implementation, lower wage expenditure decreased squad talent, which 
decreased competition, therefore, fans became unattracted (Madden, 2015), causing 
decreased FP across all of Europe’s top five leagues (Beyer, 2018). Additionally, 
as ‘Brexit’ created Pound Sterling to Euro depreciations, this meant EPL clubs had 
players requiring funds in Euros, therefore, clubs faced increased wage expenditure 
from inflated wages (Perry and Steenson, 2019). Furthermore, with ‘Brexit’ 
inflating wages, and FFP demanding decreased wages, EPL clubs struggled to obey 
FFP. Moreover, UEFA introduced FFP to reduce ‘debt-gambles', however, it 
created 'unintended consequences’ (Birkhäuser et al., 2019), especially in the EPL. 
Therefore, debts impact on FP may have suffered through a diminishing wage-
TP relationship created by FFP. 
Differentially to FFP, other sports implemented salary caps like UEFA's ‘G-
14’ idea, and resultantly, destroyed the wages-TP relationship (Szymanski, 2013). 
Whereby wages only account for 10% of variations in wins, in sports like American 
football (Szymanski, 2013). In the NFL and NHL, ‘hard’ salary caps have been 
implemented, whereby maximum payrolls cannot exceed 57% of total revenue 
(Szymanski, 2013). Differentially, in Major League Baseball (MLB), a ‘luxury tax’ 
is set, whereby clubs exceeding predetermined payrolls pay Competitive-Balance 
Taxes, and these taxes increase if done in consecutive seasons (MLB, 2020). 
Nevertheless, salary caps have diminished debts impact on FP through diminishing 
the wages-TP relationship. 
Moreover, this paper adds to previous research, regarding how wage’s impact 
on FP may have altered since FFP introduction and the modern-day productivity 
paradox, as this may have diminished since previous research. Additionally, it may 
support player investments in the current EPL wage debate, providing objective 
evidence to why EPL clubs undertake such large human capital investments. 
However, as EPL clubs are well-known to frequently favour debt-financing, instead 
of being swayed towards public funding, as mentioned, it also helps fill a gap 
regarding why EPL clubs may choose this capital structure in an attempt to 
influence FP. This gap will be addressed through using a debt-to-equity gearing 
ratio to measure capital structure, and football-operational turnover to measure FP. 
For a simplified representation of theoretical framework, see Appendix 1. 
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3 – Methodology and Research Method 
 
This chapter outlines the research methodology and method employed to conduct 
the study. Therefore, the discussion of research methodology, data collection, data 
adjustment, and research methods are justified. 
 
3.1 Research Methodology 
Advocated by many economists, like Milton Friedman and John Maynard 
Keynes's father, John Neville Keynes, a logical positivist approach is where 
combinations of theory and factual knowledge (i.e. measurements) source 
hypotheses and create reliable conclusions providing trustworthy knowledge 
(Ethridge, 2004). This paper adopts this, using the EW theory (Blanchard and 
Johnson, 2013) and factual knowledge from the FAME database and EPL website. 
This is approach was chosen because it argues against debates created by 
personal judgements and highlights the importance of objectivity in economic 
research by creating fact-based conclusions (Ethridge, 2004). This is significantly 
important with debt’s impact on FP because the intertwined relationship between 
human capital investments and TP is heavily debated, therefore, this approach 
helps factualise the debate, providing objectivity. Additionally, this indicates an 
inductive approach (Ethridge, 2004), as conclusions are reached through previous 
literature and theories, as mentioned. Worth noting this is not pure positivism, but 
a modern view, as pure positivism disregards theory and only focuses upon factual 
knowledge (Ethridge, 2004). 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
As logical positivist approaches are adopted, quantitative data is gathered 
because it provides factual knowledge needed for reliable conclusions (Ethridge, 
2004). Additionally, the scientific approach to collect quantitative data allows for 
objective conclusions, opposing the subjective nature originating from qualitative 
data (Bryman, 2016). Secondary data is used because it entails high-quality data 
gathered in short time-periods with minimal costs (Bryman, 2016). Therefore, as 
collection sources include the FAME database, containing original data 
according to a company’s official filed documents (Bureau van Dijk, 2020), and the 
EPL website, the official website of the EPL (Premier League, 2020), secondary 
9
Robinson: Gambling With Debt: The English Premier League
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2020
 
data is considered high-quality, despite the study’s short completion time-
limit. Furthermore, other data types like primary data are unsuitable due to the data 
collection’s lengthy process (Ethridge, 2004).   
The FAME database provides intangible assets, total turnover, turnover from 
non-football operations, gearing ratios, and wage costs from the 2000/01 season to 
the 2017/18 season for 45 clubs.  
Wage costs collected include all an EPL club’s employees, not just players, as 
done in previous research because player wages account for the largest shares of 
wages (Szymanski, 2013). Additionally, Carmichael et al.’s (2011) wages 
adjustment is adopted, whereby wage costs are percentage shares of a club’s total 
turnover in each season, because this captures the excessive wage-spending 
historically undertaken by clubs, demonstrating the EPL’s expenditure control 
problem, as mentioned in Section 2.2 (Parliament. House of Commons, 2011). For 
this reason, normalising wage data is unnecessary, as this adjustment does 
this. Lags were also considered due to thoughts new player’s take time to adapt, 
however, in the EPL they adjust ‘almost instantly’ (BBC, 2020), therefore, this was 
also unnecessary.   
However, although literature describes human capital investments of wages as 
player talent indicators (Carmichael et al., 2011), wages are technically just short-
run costs according to Gillespie (2014), therefore, they are seen as a control 
variable. Furthermore, to measure player human capital investments, intangible 
assets are used like in Mnzava’s (2013) study, because players are placed under 
intangible assets on balance sheets 2  (RSM, 2017; PwC, 2018), meaning this 
variable is more representative of player talent. Moreover, the relationship 
originating between intangible assets and FP should be positive, whereby higher 
player talent investments create increased TPs that coincide higher FPs. However, 
it may be, TPs do not have this impact, just intangible assets. In this case, it indicates 
human capital investments enhances FPs themselves, potentially through higher 




2 This is because players provide future economic benefits to clubs with their matchday 
performances, therefore, revenue can be generated through merchandising, gate receipts and so on 
(Mnzava, 2013). Furthermore, players are placed under intangible assets in forms of player 
registration costs, known as ‘rights to use’ (RSM, 2017). 
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To measure FP, Raja and Morrow’s (2007) turnover adjustment is adopted, 
where turnover from non-football operations is taken from total turnover, leaving 
football-operational turnover. This is because total turnover contains wealthy 
benefactor’s income, not connected with a club's market orientations (Ozawa et al., 
2004), therefore, this allows FP to be more representative than other FP measures 
in research (Raja and Morrow, 2007). 
With usage of 2018 yearly turnover, each club’s 2018 market share is calculated 
following Cooper and Nakanishi’s (1988) formula (Figure 3.6.1). The clubs are 
split in half dependent on their 2018 market shares to determine club size (Appendix 
3), whereby a club size dummy variable can be created: 1 = large club and 0 = small 
club. A robustness test is undertaken afterwards to determine whether this is 
because larger clubs follow a debt-fueled EW concept. This is because larger clubs 
may have larger capital resources access, therefore, may invest significantly more 
debt (Carmichael et al., 2011), meaning extents of debt’s impact on FP differs 
depending on club size. Furthermore, the debt-FP relationship in large clubs is 
expected to be stronger.  
The capital structure measure, gearing ratios, are collected to capture club’s 
debt-to-equity compositions, similar to Wilson et al. (2013), 
because they emphasise an EPL club’s debt-dependency, therefore, providing 
good capital structure representations within’ the industry. It is 
expected debt has an inverse relationship with FP, as according 
to the EW concept, in the long-run, FP increases result in total debt decreases.  
The EPL website provides total points from the 2000/01 season to the 2017/18 
season. Total points are adjusted to percentage shares of total points achieved by 
all clubs during the season, as commonly used in football industry research, 
because it regards club’s forms throughout the season (Michie and Oughton, 
2004; Carmichael et al., 2011)3. For further information on wage costs, turnover, 
gearing ratios and total points adjustments, view Figure 3.6.1. 
 
3.3 Sample 
Data collection required a type of non-probability sampling known as 
convenience sampling to select clubs because there is no significant costs and time 
difficulties, like probability sampling (Bryman, 2016). Therefore, proving useful 
 
3 This opposes measures, like a club’s total points as a percentage of total achievable points 
(Carmichael et al. 2011), which does not account for this. 
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considering the paper’s short completion time-length. Although, due to this short 
time-length, qualitative data could not be collected, like managerial tactics, to 
explain debt-FPs qualitative relationship. 
Initially, 45 clubs were selected because of competing in the EPL once from 
the 2000/01 season to the 2017/18 season, however, 9 clubs were omitted as 
they only competed once during this period, therefore, they provided poor TP data 
because of the league’s nature of promotion and relegation. Furthermore, clubs 
that competed in the EPL more than once were left, ensuring enough TP data was 
available. No further adjustments could occur (i.e. include teams that 
competed three times, instead of twice) because this created a small data set (Delice, 
2010). TP data only includes EPL seasons because this ensures 
conclusions are specific to the EPL, and no other leagues below. The sample also 
entailed gearing ratio data gaps because EPL clubs are not required to publish them. 
Additionally, there is only 17 years of available data for each club. However, 
the 17 years collected is the most current data available, an aspect of secondary data 
stressed to be present for accurate conclusions within’ secondary data research 
(Johnston, 2014). Furthermore, this leaves an unbalanced panel dataset of 36 teams 
from 45 initially chosen, which is still a well-covered sample size (Delice, 2010). 
Additionally, other studies used unbalanced panel data sets as well (Garcia-del-
Barrio and Szymanski, 2009) and come to similar conclusions as balanced panel 
data research (Carmichael et al., 2011). 
 
3.4 Ethical Issues 
Economic and Social Research Council’s six key research ethics principles 
(ESRC, 2020), Data Protection Act (Data Protection Act 1998), and University of 
Derby’s Good Scientific Practice (University of Derby, 2020) are adhered to. No 
ethical issues present because of secondary data usage from public databases: 
FAME and the EPL website. Ethics Form was filled out appropriately and 
submitted for approval to Research Ethics Committee before undertaking data 
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3.5 Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics will summarise the variables, afterwards, panel models 
are used as they include more accurate parameter inferences than other 
methods because they account for more variability and degrees of freedom (Hsiao, 
2007).  
Intangible assets and football-operation turnover have natural logarithm 
adjustments. Others: gearing ratios, wage-turnover ratio and total points to total 
points achieved ratio are in percentage formats, therefore, natural logarithms 
are unnecessary. Econometric estimates of this paper are conducted by employing 
STATA, like in other studies (Carmichael et al., 2014). Furthermore, variable 
labels for each model are demonstrated below: 
Table 3.6.1 - Variable Labels 
Label Variable Used Equation 
FP LN Football 
Operation Turnover 
Total Turnover – Non-Football 
Operations Turnover 
D Gearing Ratio ( ( Short-term Loans and Overdrafts 
+ Long-term Liabilities ) / 
Shareholders Funds ) * 100 
W Wage-Turnover Ratio ( One Club’s Total Wage Costs in a 
Season / One Club’s Total Turnover 
in a Season ) * 100 
IA LN Intangible Assets - 
TP Total Points to Total 
Points Achieved Ratio 
( Total Points in a Season / Total 
Points Achieved by All EPL Clubs 
in that Season ) * 100 
CS Club Size ( ( 2018 Total Club Turnover ) / ( All 
36 Clubs Total 2018 Turnover ) ) * 
100 
Source: Cooper and Nakanishi (1988); Raja and Morrow (2007); Carmichael et al. (2011); 
Bureau van Dijk (2020). 
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Before analysis, variable stationarity is tested because a non-stationary series 
would produce spurious regressions (Stock and Watson, 2015). Therefore, Fisher-
type (FT) unit-root tests based on Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests are undertaken because 
FTs allow for unbalanced panels (STATA, 2020). 
Afterwards, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multivariate regression minimises 
sums of squared residuals ensuring estimates are close to the data collected 
(Studenmund, 2017). OLS model is: 
 𝐹𝑃?̂? = ?̂?0 +  𝛽1̂𝐷1 +  𝛽2̂𝑊2 +  𝛽3̂𝐼𝐴3 +  𝛽4̂𝑇𝑃4 + 𝛽5̂𝐶𝑆5 (1) 
However, OLS includes simultaneity bias, therefore, considering alternative 
models is essential (Studenmund, 2017). This paper follows Carmichael et al.’s 
(2011) Fixed-Effect Model (FEM) or Random-Effect Model (REM) usage. 
FEMs estimate panel models including dummy variables allowing each period and 
cross-sectional entity to have different intercepts (Studenmund, 2017). 
Differentially, REMs assume intercepts for cross-sectional units are from 
distributions centered around mean intercepts, therefore, each intercept is 
independent from error terms (Studenmund, 2017). FEM and REM is respectively: 
 
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡̂ −  𝐹𝑃𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ =  ?̂?1(𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷?̅?) + ?̂?2(𝛥𝑊𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝑖̅̅ ̅) + ?̂?3(𝛥𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝐴𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ )
+ ?̂?4(𝛥𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑃𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ )  +  ?̂?5(𝛥𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑆𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ) + µ̂𝑖𝑡 −  µ?̅? 
(2) 
 
             𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡̂ = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑊𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?3𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?4𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?5𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
                           𝑣𝑖𝑡, where 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡 + µ̂𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
However, as FEMs assume constant slopes across entities, whereby variables 
are not random, this model would be unrealistic with football industry research. For 
example, it would assume TP measures like the one used are fixed. However, this 
is a significantly unrealistic assumption, as if this were true, there would be no point 
competing in the league as total points each team achieves are already fixed. 
Therefore, as a REM suggests variables are random, this is much more realistic, 
considering the variables used in this paper to provide econometric estimates. 
However, to determine between a FEM or REM, a Hausman test is undertaken as 
commonly done in football industry research (Carmichael et al., 2011), which 
determines whether FEM and REM coefficients are statistically 
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Furthermore, the hypothesis of this paper is as follows. 
H0 = Debt has no relationship with FP in the English Premier League. 
H1 = Debt has a relationship with FP in the English Premier League. 
 
4 – Analysis and Findings 
 
This chapter includes findings from descriptive statistics and econometric 
estimates, with significant emphasis on whether the debt-fueled EW 
concept is followed using debt financing, and the main hypothesis is met. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1.14 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum DF 
Results 
FP 63665.0 79380.0 -71712.0 554859.0 0.0031 
D 202.7 199.6 1.0 976.0 0.0000 
W 306.9 1256.4 0.0 12399.0 0.0000 
IA 36079.1 56966.9 4.0 489307.0 0.0085 
TP 5.0 1.6 1.1 9.6 0.0033 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
View Table 3.6.1 for variable label reminders. Firstly, DF test results5 in Table 
4.1.1 suggest rejecting null hypothesis and accepting the alternate hypothesis, 
indicating stationary data at ordinary level, therefore, regressing the original data 
will not produce spurious regressions. 
 
 
4Football Operation Turnover and Intangible Assets are in millions, without natural logarithms. 
5 DF results show p-values from tests with no trend. 
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On Table 4.1.1, mean operational turnover is £63,664,960, supporting the 
2010-12 Football Governance Report, that generating revenue is not an EPL 
problem (Parliament. House of Commons, 2011). However, as some clubs faced 
multiple relegations since their last EPL involvement, operational turnovers range 
widely within’ the sample, whereby some are even negative, seen from 
high standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values, -£71,712,000 and 
£554,859,000, respectively. This is because with relegations, income from revenue 
streams depreciates, for example, matchday attendances may decrease, decreasing 
matchday revenue. However, regarding the significantly high standard deviation, 
this may explain why some football clubs do not go toward public funding as its 
unnecessary for them in doing so. 
Gearing ratios mean is 202.7%, emphasising significant debt usage within club 
operations. Further emphasised through a significantly large maximum value of 
976%, presumably because this club has continued ‘chasing the dream’ (Wilson 
and Joyce, 2008, p. 10) and not yet achieved it. Hence why many become like Leeds 
United in 2007 (Gerrard, 2004). However, standard deviations indicate 
large spreads, as demonstrated through minimum and maximum values, 1% and 
976% respectively. This could possibly be club size impacting capital 
resource access, as larger clubs may have greater access (Carmichael et al., 
2011) due to debt settlement reliability, opposed to smaller clubs who may be 
unreliable and reluctant with large debt. This links to above, whereby relegations 
may create unreliable revenue streams, possibly creating reluctancy in smaller 
clubs. 
Mean wage costs as total turnover shares are 306.9%, highlighting EPL 
clubs’ excess wage spending and emphasising expenditure control is an EPL 
problem (Parliament. House of Commons, 2011). Additionally, being more than 
100%, suggesting wage costs are above earnings, it indicates most 
expenditure originates from debt, not equity. As standard deviation is 
large, indicating large spreads, this could possibly be because some clubs may have 
larger access to capital resources (Carmichael et al., 2011) as explained 
above, therefore, investments differ from club-to-club. 
Mean intangible asset holdings are £36,079,110, stressing the high values 
which player talent is often judged to be worth. However, as with other variables, 
intangible holdings range widely, seen from the significantly large standard 
deviation, and minimum and maximum values, £4,000 
and £489,307,000, respectively. This accentuates size difference amongst clubs in 
the sample, hence why a club size dummy variable was necessary. 
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Points as total points percentages has a mean value of 5%. However, this differs 
from other variables with a low standard deviation suggesting small 
spreads. Further advocating, EPL competition is relatively balanced as club’s 
competitive market share according to points won is relatively indifferent, opposing 
declined EPL competitiveness findings (Madden, 2015; Beyer, 2018). However, 
minimum, and maximum values still range widely from Derby County Football 
Club achieving 1.1% in 2008 and Manchester City Football Club achieving 9.6% 
in 2018, accentuating competition may still not be strongly balanced amongst some 
teams. 
4.2 Regression Model  







Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                    
Adjusted R-squared          0.796           0.732                   
Observations                  128             128             128   
                                                                    
                           (2.67)             (.)          (2.41)   
CS                          0.401**             0           0.394*  
                           (1.12)         (-0.43)          (0.87)   
TP                         0.0414         -0.0244          0.0339   
                           (7.71)          (7.24)          (7.78)   
IA                          0.342***        0.345***        0.345***
                         (-16.69)        (-17.05)        (-16.93)   
W                       -0.000706***    -0.000737***    -0.000714***
                          (-3.96)         (-2.89)         (-3.88)   
D                        -0.00104***     -0.00105**      -0.00104***
                                                                    
                               FP              FP              FP   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)   
                                                                    
OLS FEM REM 
0.779 
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(3.88) (16.93) (7.78) 
(0.87) (2.41) 
Worth noting, other TP measures were regressed, like goal difference 
(Carmichael et al., 2014) and total points as shares of total achievable 
points (Carmichael et al., 2011), however, these did not fit and were 
omitted. Additionally, OLS model will not be considered due to simultaneity bias 
mentioned. 
The Hausman test concluded insignificance, therefore, the null hypothesis was 
accepted suggesting REM is more appropriate, consistent with Carmichael et 
al.’s (2011) study.  
Moreover, the REM is6: 
 
   𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 − 0.0011𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 0.0012𝑊𝑖𝑡 +  0.3453𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡  
+0.0344𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  0.3945𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣it 
(4) 
 
With 99% significance, debt has an inverse relationship with FP in the EPL, 
whereby a 1% increase in debt, decreases FP by 0.001% (3 d.p). Therefore, debt 
has a significantly small impact on FP, however, whether consistent with the 
EW concept (Blanchard and Johnson, 2013) depends on other variable’s 
significance. This result cannot be compared to other studies regarding EW 
concepts because of the present gap in this area. 
Similarly, with 99% significance, wage costs have an inverse relationship 
with FP, whereby a 1% increase in wage costs decreases FP by 0.001% 
(3 d.p). This significantly small inverse relationship, similar to debt, opposes 
studies who found direct relationships (Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski, 2009; 
Carmichael et al., 2011), emphasising wages may not ‘systematically 
reflect player’s skills and performances’ (Carmichael et al., 2011) and are simply 
just short-run costs (Gillespie, 2014). Additionally, the inverse relationship could 
be resultant of the modern-day productivity paradox (Brynjolfsson et al., 2017), 
whereby increasing wages now have opposite impacts on FP due to recent 
technological advancements deteriorating productivity. For example, football 
players may be more focused on social media performance (i.e. number of 
 
6 Regression constants not included in equation because maintaining focus upon specific 
independent variables, and numbers below in brackets are t-statistics. Additionally, investigating 
cross-sectoral effects between variables was considered, however, the REM assumes these are 
uncorrelated, therefore this was unnecessary. 
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followers), instead of playing performances. This highlights past findings may be 
unrepresentative of today’s wages and FP relationship. Therefore, placing more 
prominence on wages as a control variable and intangible assets as a more accurate 
indication of player human capital investment. 
With 99% significance, intangible assets have a direct impact on FP, whereby 
a 1% increase in human capital investment increases FP by 0.345% (3 d.p). This 
relatively large impact suggests high player talent investment strongly increases 
FPs. Similarly, Mnzava (2013) discovered at 99% significance, a 1% increase 
in human capital investment increased FP by 0.213%. This direct link between 
intangible assets and FP could exist because higher human capital investment 
enhances brand-management (Rohde and Breuer, 2016), which enhances revenue 
streams elsewhere. For example, buying an incredibly talented player may enhance 
merchandising sales through resultant shirt sales. Although, despite estimating a 
slightly larger impact of intangible assets on FP than Mnzava’s (2013) study with 
similar significance, it is likely Mnzava’s (2013) estimates are more representative 
as they included 194 observations, whereas this paper includes 128.   
Moreover, the difference of impact between intangible assets and wage costs 
provides evidence wages do not necessarily ‘reflect player’s skills and 
performances’ (Carmichael et al., 2011) as wages would have a similar direct 
relationship. Therefore, this places prominence on using intangible assets as a more 
accurate indicator of player human capital investment. However, if this was not the 
case, and wages were still assumed to ‘reflect player’s skills and performances’ 
(Carmichael et al., 2011), this supports Szymanski’s (2013) criticisms of wage’s 
reflecting player talent, mentioning managers could misinterpret talent before 
signings, as this shows players signed on high wages, could still have low 
talent.  Nonetheless, this suggests human capital investments increasing player 
talent have positive impacts on FP, supporting other studies (Garcia-del-Barrio and 
Szymanski, 2009; Carmichael et al., 2011; Mnzava, 2013). 
Although TPs have a direct relationship with FP, whereby a 1% increase 
in TPs increases FPs by 0.034% (3 d.p), this is insignificant, therefore, TPs are not 
consistent with FPs. This opposes studies like Carmichael et al.’s (2011) who used 
this indicator to measure TPs impact on FP, and found at 99% significance, a 1% 
increase in TPs creates a 0.77% increase in FPs. However, this could support 
Szymanski’s (2013) criticisms, whereby increased human capital investment does 
not always increase TPs, because players may have poor cooperation on the field, 
there is talent misjudgments, or simply, because players may become ill or get 
injured. 
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* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                    
Adjusted R-squared          0.800           0.751                   
Observations                   95              95              95   
                                                                    
                           (0.87)         (-1.29)          (0.28)   
TP                         0.0389         -0.0954          0.0142   
                           (6.66)          (6.36)          (6.82)   
IA                          0.344***        0.345***        0.350***
                         (-15.01)        (-15.35)        (-15.45)   
W                       -0.000709***    -0.000735***    -0.000722***
                          (-3.20)         (-3.04)         (-3.04)   
D                       -0.000982**      -0.00128**     -0.000988** 
                                                                    
                               FP              FP              FP   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)   
                                                                    
Regarding club size, with 95% significance, if a club is considered large, it has 
a 0.394% larger direct impact than smaller clubs on FPs. However, to identify 
whether this is because larger clubs may follow a debt-fuelled EW concept, a 
robustness test was undertaken for large football clubs, whereby a Hausman test 
selected REM. 












Source: Author’s own calculations 
Results are quite consistent, whereby debt and wages have significant indirect 
relationships with FP, whereas intangible assets have a significant direct 
relationship with FP. Additionally, TP is also insignificant within’ large clubs. 
Therefore, larger clubs may have a larger impact on FP than smaller clubs because 
they may use debt to invest in human capital, described above. This may 
support Carmichael et al. (2011), whereby larger clubs may have larger capital to 
invest in more talent. However, as the EW concept is cut short because of the 
uncertainty factor in a club’s TP making the variable insignificant in this regression, 
further research into TP indicators would be beneficial. 
REM FEM OLS 
0.789 
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Estimations also undertaken for small clubs, however, limited observations 
could have created estimation biases. Therefore, results will not be discussed in this 
dissertation. Additionally, this is the reason the analysis was not split dependent on 
club size, and instead, a club size dummy variable was created. 
Furthermore, independent variables in equation 4 account for 0.779(R2) of 
changes in an EPL club’s FP from the 2000/01 season to the 2017/18 season, 
suggesting the independent variables chosen account for significant amounts of 
variation in FP within’ football clubs. This is also similar in large clubs whereby 
independent variables account for 0.789(R2). 
Overall, this paper’s second objective has been met, as debt has an inverse 
relationship with FP, however, not necessarily through a debt-fueled EW concept, 
as results confirm this concept is not consistent with the EPL from the 2000/01 
season to the 2017/18 season because TPs (i.e. productivity) did not follow, further 
emphasising Szymanski’s (2013) criticisms. In fact, as the EW concept was cut 
short, debts inverse relationship with FP could be a result of debt-fueled human 
capital investments enhancing revenue streams through brand-management (Rohde 
and Breuer, 2016), as described above. 
Additionally, results are consistent with large clubs, suggesting they may have 
a larger impact on FP than small clubs because of greater human capital 
investments. Furthermore, this paper’s third objective has been met. 
 
5 – Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Econometric estimations are considered successful as all variables were 
significant, apart from TP. Therefore, this helps fill a gap regarding how a club’s 
capital structure may potentially be rearranged to impact FP in football, through 
human capital player investments funded with debt. Econometric estimations were 
successful regarding club size, demonstrating how capital structure rearrangement 
may have a greater impact on FP in larger clubs. Furthermore, the research question 
is answered and the aim is achieved, whereby debt does have a significant inverse 
relationship with FP, however, it could be through debt-fueled player human capital 
investments enhancing club revenues (Rohde and Breuer, 2016) rather than an EW 
concept. Therefore, further research is recommended into this area, using many 
different TP indicators. 
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Regarding the EPL wage debate explored in Chapter 2, whereby this paper’s 
first objective was met, this paper supports the EPL wage debate, producing 
objective evidence supporting increased player human capital investments as a 
possible route to higher FPs. However, these higher FPs are not necessarily through 
higher investment resulting in increased productivity (i.e. team-success), as with 
player’s you essentially get what you pay for, demonstrated through insignificant 
TP variables.  Additionally, this paper places more prominence with wages as a 
control variable, and intangible assets as a more accurate indication of player human 
capital investment. Furthermore, this validates studies like Mnzava (2013), 
suggesting increased player human capital investments creates enhanced FP, 
however, it also opposes studies like Carmichael et al. (2011), providing evidence 
wage costs may not ‘systematically reflect a player’s skills and performances’, and 
intangible assets are more accurate player talent indicators. 
Additionally, as wage’s inverse relationship opposes past research (Hall et al., 
2002; Carmichael et al., 2011), this paper recommends further research into the 
modern-day productivity paradox’s (Brynjolfsson et al., 2017) impact on the wage-
FP relationship, as this is not heavily researched and could explain wage’s 
opposing relationship. This could be feasible by using a variable covering 
technological advancements and testing it against player productivity. Moreover, 
this paper also recommends further research into how a club’s capital structure 
could impact FP within’ other leagues to see if results are consistent 
internationally and domestically, feasible through undertaking similar research 
methods used in this paper. However, inclusions of capital resource 
access indicators are recommended in further research, as explaining potential links 
between club size and FP was based upon Carmichael et al.’s (2011) 
explanation. Therefore, other research could incorporate access to debt financing 
indicators suggested by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (2011). Additionally, as only the quantitative side of the debt-FP 
relationship was concluded, research into debt’s qualitative impact on FP would 
allow for other explanations. Although qualitative data collection may prove 
difficult, interviews or questionnaires within’ football clubs could be undertaken 
for a longitudinal study to gather data on variables like managerial tactics. 
Reflecting upon this paper, a larger time-length of data could be sourced to 
provide more observations within’ the econometric estimations to increase 
representativeness. Additionally, more variables could have been used to account 
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Appendix 1 – Theoretical Framework 
Author(s) Findings 
Mnzava (2013) Intangible assets have a positive 
relationship with sporting 
performance and financial 
performance in UK football 
clubs. 
Vöpel (2011) Uncertainty of outcome is one of 
the most important determinants 
of football demand. 
Plumley et al. (2018) Uncertainty of outcome is 
essential in maintaining high 
demand that creates football’s 
high market value. 
Buraimo and Simmons (2008) U-shape relationship between 
win probability and attendance, 
therefore, fans attracted to games 
if team has low winning 
probability because of 
uncertainty of outcome and 
attracted to high winning 
probability games because their 
team is likely to win. 
Alchian (1950) Profit-maximisation is an aim 
originating from natural 
biological processes. 
Atkinson et al. (1988) In the NFL, behaviour is 
consistent with utility-
maximisation. 
Dutta and Radner (1999) Profit-maximising firms are 
significantly likely to fail in finite 
time. 
Vrooman (2009) Sportsman owners aim for win-
maximisation, but profit-
maximising owners aim 
to optimise inputs and outputs. 
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Késenne (2006) Win-maximisation clubs hire 
more playing talents but also, 
charge higher ticket prices. 
Samagaio et al. (2009) Sport managers aim for win-
maximisation, but also, to 
achieve a minimum level of 
profit. 
Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski (2009) Behaviour in Spanish and English 
football leagues is consistent with 
win-maximisation subject to a 
zero-level profit constraint. Any 
team adopting profit 
maximisation strategies would 
likely be relegated. 
Zimbalist (2003) In professional sport’s leagues, 
owners often maximise global, 
long-term returns, which is quite 
different from annual operating 
profits. 
Rapp (2004) Increased levels of spending in 
one campaign follows 
performance below expectations 
in the previous campaign. 
Gerrard (2004) Leeds United is a classic example 
of a club having overly ambitious 
objectives, therefore, they 
suffered financial crisis when 
they failed to achieve team-
success.  
Wage costs quadrupled after 
1999. Gearing ratios became 
98.34%. Therefore, they 
eventually received a winding-up 
order from its debtors. 
Drut and Raballand (2012) Club’s allowed to run larger 
deficits and borrow more freely, 
like in England, Spain, and Italy, 
hire more playing talents and 
therefore, achieve better sporting 
results than clubs of equivalent 
size. 
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Szymanski (2013) Increasing payrolls does not 
create increased sporting 
performances because managers 
occasionally misinterpret player 
talent and players envy one 
another if on differing payrolls. 
Vöpel (2011) Increasing payrolls does not 
create increasing sporting 
performances because players 
can unexpectedly get injured or 
have poor fitness. 
Morrison (1996) Fans in the United States are 
distressed that their favourite 
recreational activities are just 
another commercial enterprise. 
They relate this to the greed of 
professional athletes within’ the 
enterprises. 
Hall et al. (2002) Granger causality test identified 
causality between performance 
and payroll runs in both 
directions, not just from wages to 
sporting performance. 
Carmichael et al. (2011) Success on the field is 
systematically linked to the skills 
and performances of players. 
Rohde and Breuer (2016) Sporting success is driven by 
team investments. 
Dobson and Goddard (1998) Improvement in performances is 
rewarded with increases in 
attendance which increase 
revenue shares. 
Samagaio et al. (2009) Participation in UEFA 
competitions enhances growth of 
income for clubs. 
Carmichael et al. (2011) Financial performance from 
attending high paying UEFA 
competitions originates from a 
superstar wage effect, whereby 
the more talents a club has, the 
more likely they are to attend. 
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Additionally, some clubs have 
access to resources that others do 
not, resulting in them getting a 
sustained advantage. 
Rohde and Breuer (2016) Financial success is driven by 
national, as well as international 
sporting success. Additionally, it 
is heavily driven by brand 
management. 
Dietl et al. (2007) Clubs have historically 
overinvested in playing talent 
arising. 
Vöpel (2011) Some clubs face crisis’s because 
all clubs cannot simultaneously 
succeed due to the nature of 
competition. 
Szymanski (2013) UEFA considered introducing a 
G-14 payroll cap in the 2005/06 
season where payrolls could not 
exceed 70% of revenue. 
Vöpel (2011) The debt-ceiling arising from 
FFP violates a goal of FFP itself, 
to restore competitive balance, as 
clubs will not have access to 
capital resources so they cannot 
close gaps on national 
champions. Therefore, FFP may 
restore competition amongst 
larger clubs, but not smaller 
clubs. Furthermore, EPL loses 
competitiveness. 
Grasso (2011) FFP places more emphasis on 
sporting-success arising from 
managerial and administrative 
abilities of a football club, instead 
of financial capabilities. 
Madden (2015) FFP decreases team qualities due 
to decreased investments, which 
leads to Pareto disimprovement 
for all fans.  
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Beyer (2018) FFP has decreased revenues 
across Europe’s top 5 leagues as 
a result of decreased competition. 
Plumley et al. (2018) FFP has neither declined, or 
increased EPL competitiveness. 
Perry and Steenson (2019) EPL clubs faced inflated wages 
as a result of ‘Brexit’ 
depreciating the Pound to Euro 
exchange rate, because players 
began asking for wages in Euros. 
Szymanski (2013) Wages only account for 10% of 
win variations in basketball and 
American football as a result of 
their salary cap regulations. 
 








Market Share (%) = ( ( 2018 Total Club Turnover ) / ( All 36 Clubs Total 
2018 Turnover ) ) * 100 
Debt-to-Equity 
Gearing Ratio (%) 
= ( ( Short-term Loans and Overdrafts + Long-term 
Liabilities ) / Shareholders Funds ) * 100 
Total Points to 
Total EPL Points in a 
Season (%) 
= ( Total Points in a Season / Total Points Achieved by 
All EPL Clubs in that Season ) * 100 
Wage-Turnover Ratio 
(%) 
= ( One Club’s Total Wage Costs in a Season / One 
Club’s Total Turnover in a Season ) * 100 
Football Operation 
Turnover  
= Total Turnover – Non-Football Operations Turnover 
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Appendix 3 – Market Share Club Split 
Large Clubs Club 2018 Market 
Share (%)  








THE LIVERPOOL FOOTBALL CLUB AND 
ATHLETIC GROUNDS LIMITED 
10.16194073 
 
CHELSEA FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED 9.436319087  
THE ARSENAL FOOTBALL CLUB 
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
8.677247756 
 
























AFC BOURNEMOUTH LIMITED 3.011387856  




STOKE CITY FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED 2.8401424  
SWANSEA CITY ASSOCIATION 
FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED(THE) 
2.832081426 
 




ASTON VILLA FC LIMITED 1.594643762  
MIDDLESBROUGH FOOTBALL & 
ATHLETIC COMPANY (1986) LIMITED 
1.384343891 
Small Clubs  
NORWICH CITY FOOTBALL CLUB PLC 1.376997464  
HULL CITY TIGERS LIMITED 1.243310341 
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QUEENS PARK RANGERS FOOTBALL & 
ATHLETIC CLUB LIMITED(THE) 
0.935899179 
 




FULHAM FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED 0.854485575  





FOOTBALL CLUB (1986) LIMITED 
0.589500593 
 












THE BLACKBURN ROVERS FOOTBALL 
AND ATHLETIC LIMITED 
0.200363213 
 




WIGAN ATHLETIC A.F.C. LIMITED 0.148938218  
TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR LIMITED 0.085008665  
SUNDERLAND ASSOCIATION 
FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED(THE) 
0.014089957 
 
CRYSTAL PALACE F.C. (2000) LIMITED 
 
 




THE BOLTON WANDERERS FOOTBALL 
& ATHLETIC COMPANY LIMITED 
 
 
Worth noting market shares could not be calculated for Crystal Place, Portsmouth, 
and Bolton due to missing 2018 turnover data resulting from them going into 
administration. 
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